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Abstract
This paper analyses the effects of the structure of collective bargaining on its main
results. To do this it uses the individual information on collective agreements signed in
Spain between 1990 and 2001, drawn from the official statistics on collective bargaining
agreements compiled by the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social Security. The empirical 
analysis conducted shows that the bargaining level has a significant effect both on wage
increases and on the distribution of the wage levels established in collective agreements. At 
an intermediate bargaining level, that is to say at the provincial industry level, larger wage
increases are usually seen than those agreed both at the more centralised (i.e. national
industry) and more decentralised (company) levels. Furthermore, bargaining at higher than
company levels considerably reduces wage differentials between job categories.
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1. Introduction  
The collective bargaining system is a fundamental mechanism for explaining the 
workings of the Spanish labour market. Around 90% of private-sector wage-earners in 
Spain see their wage (and, generally, working) conditions set in collective bargaining 
between trade union and employers' representatives. This figure is among the highest 
for European countries and clearly exceeds that for the United States or the United 
Kingdom, for instance. 
However, the analysis of the effects that the collective bargaining system has on 
the workings of the labour market, and on the Spanish economy in general, is strongly 
constrained by the databases available. Among the papers that have analysed the 
Spanish collective bargaining system in recent years, mention may be made of that by 
Jimeno (1992), which used individual information on collective agreements signed 
mostly in the eighties in order to analyse the macroeconomic consequences of the 
collective bargaining system. His conclusions highlighted the existence of an inefficient 
bargaining mechanism hampering wage moderation. More recently, various papers 
have analysed the wage structure arising from collective bargaining by constructing 
specific databases for some periods and industries [see, for example, Lorences et al 
(1995), Abellán et al (1997) or Simón (2000)]. Generally, these studies have found 
bargaining level to have a significant effect on the wage structure established in 
collective agreements1. 
This paper marks the start of a more extensive research project seeking to 
conduct an in-depth analysis of the Spanish collective bargaining system. In this initial 
phase, the aim has been to analyse the main characteristics of the system, identifying 
those which particularly affect its results. To do this, a database comprised of individual 
information drawn from the official collective bargaining statistics compiled by the 
Spanish Ministry of Labour on each of the collective agreements signed in Spain during 
the nineties2 has been used for the first time. This information has been taken from the 
statistical records that the negotiating parties have to complete after signing each 
agreement. It enables the influence of a broad set of characteristics of the agreement on 
its results to be analysed. In particular, this initial phase has focused on analysing how 
the different characteristics of the agreement bear on the wage increases and wage 
structure established in collective bargaining. In the following phases of the project, this 
information will be combined with that from the Banco de España Central Balance Sheet 
                                                                
1 Mention should be made here also of the studies by the Ministry of Economy and Finance from 1985 to 1995 on 
collective bargaining in large firms. These studies included a highly detailed descriptive analysis of the characteristics of 
collective bargaining based on a survey conducted among firms of more than 200 employees. 
2 This database is described in Appendix 1. 
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Data Office, which will allow more detailed analysis of how the collective bargaining 
system affects the workings of companies. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises the 
legal framework in which collective bargaining is undertaken. Section 3 offers a 
descriptive analysis of the main features of the Spanish collective bargaining system, 
highlighting how it is divided into bargaining levels. In section 4 a multivariate analysis is 
performed to identify the effect of the main characteristics of bargaining on wage 
increases. Rounding off the empirical content of the paper, Section 5 analyses the 
impact of bargaining level on the wage differentials arising from collective bargaining. 
Finally, Section 6 offers a summary and draws some brief conclusions. 
2. Institutional framework 
Before analysing the characteristics of the Spanish collective bargaining system, 
we briefly describe its institutional framework. At present, the Spanish collective 
bargaining system is underpinned by principles stemming from the 1980 Estatuto de los 
Trabajadores (Workers’ Statute) and from the successive amendments thereto in the 
1990s. The basic principles of this system are: legitimacy to participate in bargaining, 
statutory extension (automatic general applicability) of any collective agreement at 
higher than company level and ultraactividad (literally “ultra-activity”) of collective 
agreements. 
First, trade unions’ legitimacy to bargain does not come from the number of 
affiliated workers. Rather, trade union representation in bargaining arises from electoral 
strength, i.e. from the votes obtained in trade union elections. The results of these 
elections bestow representativeness on those unions that obtain more than a certain 
percentage of votes, allowing them to be party to the various negotiating processes. 
Second, the principle of statutory extension establishes that any collective agreement at 
higher than company level must be applied to all companies and to all workers forming 
part of the geographical and industry level in question, even though they may not have 
participated in the bargaining process. Moreover, the regulatory mechanism in place to 
resolve conflicts between collective agreements concluded at different levels 
(concurrencia) notably limits the likelihood that lower-level collective agreements may 
change aspects already included in higher-level agreements. Finally, the “ultra-activity” 
of an agreement refers to a principle whereby it remains valid after its expiry, if it has not 
been renewed3. 
                                                                
3 For a more detailed analysis of the legal aspects of the collective bargaining system, see García-Perea et al (1999). 
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These characteristics together interact to form a collective bargaining system 
notable for the high coverage of wage earners (practically total, despite the low 
proportion of union membership) and the predominance of agreements at higher than 
company level, negotiated mainly by the majority unions and employers’ associations. 
Groups such as temporary workers (with low participation in union elections) and small 
and medium enterprises are scantly represented.  
This system has been scantly affected by the two reforms carried out in the 
1990s. The reform of Workers’ Statute by the government in 1994 sought to broaden the 
content of collective bargaining, repealed the “Ordenanzas Laborales” (Old Labour laws) 
and attempted to encourage greater decentralisation of negotiation. To this end, the 
conditions relating to conflicts between collective agreements negotiated at different 
levels was changed, albeit only slightly4 and it was made compulsory to include get-out 
clauses affording companies that find themselves in economic difficulties total or 
partial release from the obligation to comply with the pay terms specified in the 
collective agreement. In 1997, the social actors5 signed the Acuerdo Interconfederal 
sobre Negociación Colectiva (Intersectoral Agreement on Collective Bargaining) which 
advocated increasing the level of co-ordination of the collective bargaining mechanism. 
In so doing, they gave priority to country-wide industry agreements recommending the 
inclusion of a wider range of matters in the bargaining at this level. The signatories 
declined to give this agreement the status of law, leaving the social actors involved at 
each bargaining level free to decide whether to apply the proposed changes. The 
progress made in applying them has not been notable. However, the empirical analysis 
made in the following sections examines the possible effects of these reforms. 
3. Basic characteristics of collective bargaining in Spain 
3.1. Level of collective bargaining 
One of the basic features of the Spanish collective bargaining system is that it is 
divided into various bargaining levels. Given the way in which collective bargaining is 
organised in Spain, the collective agreements can be negotiated between the 
representatives of workers and employers either at the decentralised company level or 
at the more centralised industry level at its different geographical levels: local, provincial, 
regional or national. Table 1 shows that in Spain the negotiation of collective 
agreements takes place predominantly at the industry and provincial level, which 
                                                                
4 The change raised the precedence of lower-level agreements, except those at company level, relative to higher-level 
agreements. 
5 CEOE (Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales – Spanish Confederation of Employers’ 
Organisations), CEPYME (Confederación Española de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa – Spanish Confederation of 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises), UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores – General Workers’ Confederation) and 
CCOO (Comisiones Obreras – Trade Union Confederation of Workers’ Commissions). 
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represents an intermediate degree of centralisation. This is the bargaining level at which 
the working conditions of more than 50% of the workers covered by collective bargaining 
are established. As can be seen, this situation has barely changed since 1990 and the 
percentage of workers whose collective agreement is negotiated at this intermediate 
level has remained very stable over the last 12 years. 
The next most important bargaining level in terms of number of workers is the 
nation-wide industry level, which covers around 25% of workers, whereas regional 
(Autonomous Community) industry agreements, whether intra- or inter-regional 
(i.e. applicable in one or more Autonomous Communities), cover a low percentage of 
workers, around 8%. In this respect, it should be noted that intra-regional agreements 
have become increasingly important during the decade. Finally, the working conditions 
of only 10% to 15% of workers are negotiated at company level, and this percentage 
has tended to decrease in recent years. 
The collective bargaining databases do not have much information on 
companies’ characteristics that would be of use in identifying which of them may be 
influencing the choice of bargaining level. However, the number of workers covered by 
each agreement is known and, in the case of agreements at higher than company level, 
the number of companies covered is also available. This enables the average company 
size to be calculated, and these figures are included in Table 2 for the three main 
bargaining levels: company, provincial industry and national industry. 
As can be seen, company-level agreements basically affect large firms with an 
average of nearly 300 workers, while small firms are principally affected by industry 
agreements, basically of a provincial nature. The latter agreements affect firms with an 
average size of 15 workers. Finally, national industry agreements seem to be found in 
larger firms, although smaller than those covered by company-level agreements. On 
average, they affect firms with a size of 185 workers. In any event, it is noteworthy that 
since the mid-1990s the size of firms affected by national industry agreements is 
increasing. 
Disaggregated analysis of the bargaining level by industry makes it possible to 
examine the differences between industries and, furthermore, check whether the 
stability seen at aggregate level is also found across industries. The database includes 
each industry with a disaggregation at the two-digit level of the CNAE-93 (Clasificación 
Nacional de Actividades Económicas – Spanish National Classification of Economic 
Activities). Table 3 shows the distribution of workers covered by collective agreements, 
arranged by bargaining level and industry, and aggregates this variable at the level of 
the CNAE-93 section (11 broad industries). The provincial industry level is the majority 
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bargaining level, but there are significant differences between industries. In industries 
such as agriculture, construction, trade and hotels&restaurants, it is the majority 
bargaining level, being much more important than at aggregate level. However, national 
industry agreements predominate in the financial services industry and have 
above-average importance in industries such as manufacturing, business services and 
other services. Finally, company-level bargaining is practically all there is in the energy 
industry and of great importance in the extractive and transport industries.  
Perhaps the most notable feature of this industry distribution is how steady it has 
been over time. The changes in this distribution between the beginning and the end of 
the 1990s (see Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix 2) are minimal, i.e. once a certain 
bargaining level has been decided upon in a certain industry, there are unlikely to be 
significant changes over time. 
In short, collective bargaining takes place mainly at an intermediate level 
(provincial industry level), where the working conditions of more than half the workers 
covered by collective bargaining are negotiated. In all, more than 85% of workers are 
covered by industry agreements at varying geographical levels, which means that less 
than 15% of workers negotiate their working conditions at company level. This situation 
has moreover remained unchanged over the last ten years, with perhaps a slight decline 
in the importance of company-level collective bargaining in Spain. Also, company size 
exerts a clear influence, since company-level bargaining tends to gain in importance 
with increasing company size. Disaggregated analysis by industry highlights particularly 
the fact that the industry distribution of bargaining levels has remained steady over time, 
with provincial industry agreements prevailing in construction, trade and 
hotels&restaurants, while company-level agreements predominate in energy and 
transport. 
The following section analyses other characteristics of collective bargaining in 
Spain. Analysis of how the division into various bargaining levels affects the outcome of 
collective bargaining is left until Section 4. 
3.2. Subject-matter of bargaining 
The basic outcome of collective bargaining is determined by the wage increases 
agreed. However, other matters relating to working conditions are also negotiated. Our 
database has information on the agreed working hours and on whether the agreement 
does or does not contain clauses relating to certain labour matters such as employment, 
hiring, the use of overtime, workers’ welfare benefits (such as retirement supplements, 
pension plans, etc.) and the existence of worker productivity or attendance incentives. 
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Table 4 shows the percentage of workers covered by each type of clause in their 
collective agreement, distinguishing whether the negotiation took place at company or a 
higher level. In general, during the 1990s there was a trend towards the inclusion in 
collective agreements of a broader range of matters, which has led to a proliferation of 
clauses of this type. Particularly noteworthy is the growing number of agreements with 
clauses on the reduction of working hours, on hiring and on employment6. There are 
differences between bargaining levels that are worthy of comment. Generally, in 
company-level agreements a broader range of matters is negotiated and a higher 
percentage of workers at this level is covered by the various clauses analysed, except in 
the cases of reduction of working hours and of minimum wage clauses.  
The difference is particularly significant in the latter case since, although around 
30% of workers covered by industry agreements have in their agreements a clause 
establishing a minimum wage, this proportion is around 20% in company-level 
agreements. As analysed in Section 5, at the industry bargaining level there is a clear 
tendency for wage differentials to diminish. In this context, the raising of the minimum 
wage would be one more instrument contributing to its achievement. As mentioned 
above, in other respects company-level agreements are characterised by a greater 
abundance of additional clauses of this type. This is particularly so in the case of more 
specific matters dealing with the workings of the company, such as the existence of 
restaurant or transport services, but also in other more general matters, such as hiring, 
vocational training, retirement and other welfare benefits and productivity incentives.  
3.3. Time of negotiation and term of agreements 
Analysis of the time of year when collective agreements are signed may provide 
valuable information if the date is found to differ depending on bargaining level and/or 
industry. The reasoning here is that certain collective agreements may serve as a 
reference for subsequent negotiation of other agreements. In addition, the inflation 
expectations taken as the basis for negotiating wage increases for a given year will 
change during the year and this could give rise to differences in the agreed wage 
increases depending on the month in which the agreement was signed. This analysis 
could also provide information on whether the “ultra-activity” of agreements (indefinite 
prolongation in time until a new agreement is signed) signifies that a new agreement can 
only entail an improvement on the previous one; the approach here would be to identify 
the agreements that are signed a long time after the expiry of the immediately preceding 
one, thereby enabling the analysis of how the period of prolongation of these 
agreements affects the wage increases (and other matters) finally agreed upon. This 
latter exercise, however, is left for Section 4 of the paper. 
                                                                
6 Appendix 1 explains in more detail the possible content of both types of clause. 
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The best way of going about the analysis is to observe in which month or months 
most agreements are signed. First, of the total observations for which the month of 
signature of the agreement is known7, 43% relate to agreements signed around the 
middle of the year (May to July), with the greatest number being entered into in June 
(15.3%), as can be seen in Table 5. As regards the trend over time, consistently 
throughout the period most of the agreements were negotiated around the middle of the 
year, the percentages ranging from 38.8% in 1997 to 51.3% in 1991. 
Moreover, there are no notable differences between bargaining levels (see 
Table 6). The analysis by industry in Table 7 shows that only the financial services 
industry departs from the general pattern, since a significant part of its negotiation takes 
place at the end of the year, so that most agreements are signed in December (14.2% of 
all those signed in the period 1990-2001), and this trend became more pronounced over 
the period analysed. In the construction industry the percentage of agreements signed in 
the middle of the year is much higher than the average (64.6% from May to July), and 
they are concentrated most strongly in June (27.5%). 
There is thus no general pattern in the agreement signature times that would 
suggest a cascade effect in the collective bargaining system originated by certain initial 
reference agreements. Nonetheless, the effect of the month of signature on the wage 
increases agreed will be analysed in Section 4 of this paper.  
3.3.1. Term of agreements 
Another important characteristic of collective agreements is their term, i.e. the 
length of the period during which they are in force. This term is in turn a factor that can 
influence the degree of nominal inertia of the economy, in the sense that it can be 
expected that if the term of agreements is long, current wages will scarcely respond to 
changes in demand and, therefore, the variable most significantly affected will be 
unemployment (Layard et al., 1991). Also, longer agreements increase the likelihood of 
a lack of synchronisation (i.e. an overlap) of their signature time, which would also 
negatively affect wage flexibility. 
To analyse this characteristic in the available database, the observations had to 
be limited to those containing information on the dates of entry into force and expiry of 
the related agreement (43,196 observations, 72% of the total), in order to have a reliable 
measure of the term of the agreements. Also, since most multi-year agreements are 
reviewed yearly, a given agreement may have more than one entry in the database (one 
for each year in which it has economic effects), and this has to be taken into account so 
                                                                
7 These observations include some agreements signed more than a year after their period of application commenced, 
which may detract from the significance of the analysis. However, these make up less than 10% of the total. 
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as to count each multi-year agreement only once. Thus, in the period 1990-2001 there 
are observations on 26,255 different collective agreements, of which 46.1% are annual, 
30.8% are biannual (or last between one and two years) and the other 23.1% have a 
term of more than two years. Weighting for the number of workers covered by each 
agreement, the percentage covered by annual agreements decreases slightly to 39.4%, 
basically losing ground to those lasting more than two years, which rise to 30.3% 
(see Table 8). 
The trend over time (ignoring the first three years given the lack of data) shows a 
growing weight of multi-year agreements, particularly as a result of the rise in the 
percentage of agreements with a term between two and three years, and, to a lesser 
extent, of those lasting more than three years. The growing trend towards multi-year 
agreements is even more significant if the percentage of workers covered by them is 
analysed, since it has more than doubled between 1993 and 2001. This might be a 
result of a more stable macroeconomic environment (particularly after 1997), since this 
may make the bargaining agents more willing to enter into a longer-term commitment, 
i.e. to maintain for a longer time certain working conditions established in a multi-year 
agreement. 
Analysis of bargaining level shows that at provincial industry level there is a 
predominance of agreements with a term of one year or less, which represent 53.9% of 
the total agreements negotiated at this level, covering (as seen in Table 9) 48.4% of 
workers subject to such agreements. As regards company-level agreements, 44% are 
annual. However, they only cover 31.2% of workers, most of whom (the 
remaining 68.8%) are subject to agreements with a term of more than one year. Much 
the same occurs with national agreements, of which 72.6% (73.5% of the workers 
covered) are multi-year. Therefore, the provincial agreements, which are those that 
cover the highest number of workers in Spain, have on average a shorter term than the 
agreements negotiated at other levels, although it should be mentioned that, as has 
happened in the total agreement figures, multi-year agreements grew notably in 
importance during the period analysed, covering nearly 70% of workers in 2001.  
Turning to industries, in most of them the percentage of annual agreements is 
similar to that seen for the total agreements, with certain exceptions (see Table 10). In 
the case of energy, business services and other services, annual agreements have a 
lower than average weight (below 40%) and are outnumbered by those with a term of 
more than two years. By contrast, construction stands out for the high percentage of 
annual agreements (71.3%). These four industries differ even more sharply from the 
average if an analysis is made of the number of workers covered by each type of 
agreement. Moreover, in the hotel&restaurant industry and, particularly, in financial 
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services, although the proportion of agreements with a term of one year or less is near 
one-half, the percentage of workers covered by them is appreciably lower at 22.1% 
and 11.8%, respectively. Therefore nearly all industries coincide in having a high 
percentage of workers subject to multi-year agreements, except construction, in which it 
is only 19.3%.  
In short, it seems that the great majority of collective agreements in Spain have a 
term of more than a year and that the proportion of these agreements has been growing 
during the period analysed (particularly that of agreements with a term of more than two 
years). This would mean lower wage flexibility in the face of changes in the 
macroeconomic environment, although it provides more stability to labour relations. 
3.4. Inflation-adjustment clauses 
It is generally said that inflation-adjustment clauses are used as a safeguard for 
workers against deviations from expected inflation: they may well allow smaller “ex-ante” 
wage increases, but once an upward inflation shock took place, it would give rise to 
larger “ex-post” wage increases. If this were so, the effect of the clauses would be 
greater in those industries in which wage increases (without a clause) were smaller. As 
can be seen in Table 11, the effect of the clauses is greater at company and at national 
level than at provincial level8.  
One of the more interesting questions is whether the clauses guarantee the 
purchasing power of wages (i.e. whether they are calculated as the difference between 
the observed price growth and the rise in wage tariffs) or whether they guarantee the 
originally agreed gain in purchasing power (in this case, their effect would be the 
difference between observed inflation and expected inflation). Although the database 
includes variables on the threshold beyond which the clauses are effective, these are 
not very informative, because many observations are missing. In an attempt to 
approximate this information, a reference year was taken in which the clause had a 
significant effect. The year chosen was 2000, for which the official inflation forecast 
was 2%, while the year-on-year growth of the CPI in December was 4%. If the clauses 
had guaranteed the initial gains in purchasing power, their effect would have been 
approximately two percentage points, whereas if they had only been adjusted to the 
observed inflation, their effect would have been somewhat less, since they would only 
enable recovery of the difference between the increase established in collective 
agreements and the rate of inflation9. As can clearly be seen in Table 12, there are two 
tails in the distribution: on the one hand, for 43.6% of workers the effect of the clauses 
                                                                
8 Later we will look at whether the initial increases are indeed larger at the bargaining levels where the clauses have 
less effect, i.e. at provincial industry level. 
9 In 2000 the increase in wage tariffs before including the clauses was 3.1%. 
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was nil, while for 29.5% it was two percentage points. The other intervals studied are 
rather less significant, although notably there are agreements that enable the recovery 
of more than two percentage points. This distribution exhibits significant differences 
depending on the bargaining level, since at company and national level, full recovery of 
the inflation deviation is the rule, while there are many clauses in provincial agreements 
that do not give rise to a larger wage increase. 
The percentage of workers covered by clauses of this type is somewhat higher in 
provincial and national agreements than in company-level agreements. In 2000 and 
2001 there was a general increase in the frequency of indexation clauses, attributable to 
the greater uncertainty of inflation (see Table 13). When the agreements are 
disaggregated by term (see Table 14), it is found that inflation-adjustment clauses are 
more frequent in annual agreements, despite the fact that inflation uncertainty is lowest 
in agreements of this type. 
Another important aspect is whether or not the clauses are retroactive, 
i.e. whether they involve revision of wage tariffs in the year in which the inflation 
deviation occurs and, therefore, generate the payment of arrears, or whether they only 
give rise to adjustment of the wage tariffs to which the increase agreed for the following 
year is applied and, therefore, do not generate the payment of arrears. As can be seen 
in Table 15, around 60% of clauses are retroactive. Retroactive clauses are more 
common at company level (over 90%) and national level (about 80%), while they are 
less usual at provincial level (50%). There has been a very significant reduction in the 
percentage of retroactive clauses at provincial level, since in 1994-95 it was 
approximately 80%.  
4. Multivariate analysis of wage increases 
The previous sections aimed to broadly outline the Spanish collective bargaining 
system making use of the information available in the database. This section analyses 
how the various characteristics of collective agreements (particularly those mentioned 
earlier in this paper) affect the main bargaining item, i.e. the wage increase negotiated 
by the social actors. Special attention is paid to how the level of collective bargaining 
affects the resulting wage increases, both because of its empirical importance and in 
order to compare the predictions of different theoretical models. The multivariate 
analysis performed enables the effect of the bargaining level to be isolated from the 
effect of the other bargaining characteristics. 
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4.1. Bargaining level 
The starting point of this analysis is the information presented in Chart 1, which 
shows the wage increases in the 1990s by bargaining level. The wage increases 
negotiated tend to be smaller at a more centralised level (national industry) and at the 
most decentralised level (company), while the largest wage increases are observed at 
an intermediate level of centralisation (the provincial industry level). This inverted 
U-shape relationship of wage increases with increasing centralisation of bargaining is 
consistent with the results of the theoretical models that predict higher wage pressure at 
intermediate levels than at more centralised or decentralised levels (see Calmfors and 
Drifill, 1988; and Layard et al., 1991). Empirically it is also an important phenomenon, as 
negotiation at this intermediate bargaining level is the majority practice in Spain and 
around 50% of workers covered by collective agreements negotiate at this level. 
However, this finding should be analysed more closely to find out whether it is a 
direct effect of bargaining level or whether it is caused by a differing composition of 
industries or of other characteristics associated with bargaining level. To do this, a 
regression of the agreed wage increases was estimated on a set of explanatory 
variables including bargaining level as well as other variables that may affect this result. 
These other variables included were as follows. First, dummy variables for the 
industries, in order to capture the effect of the different industry distribution at each 
bargaining level and its possible influence on the final result. Second, yearly and 
monthly dummy variables to capture the macroeconomic context in general10, and the 
effect on wage increases of the time when the negotiation took place. Third, two 
variables were included to reflect two key characteristics of collective agreements, 
namely the existence of indexation clauses and the multi-year nature of the agreement.  
This regression was estimated for the period from 1990 to 2000 (the last year for 
which we have complete data), although yearly estimates were also made to check the 
robustness of the results obtained. Table 16 shows the results for the complete 
1990-2000 period. The effect of bargaining level on wage increases has been captured 
through an dummy variable for each of them, distinguishing, at company level, between 
public- and private-sector firms in order to isolate the effect of public-sector firms on 
wage increases. Also, private-sector firms are grouped into four sizes: small (fewer 
than 30 workers), medium (30 to 100 workers), large (100 to 500 workers) and very 
large (over 500 workers). 
The main finding of this regression analysis is that, once account is taken of the 
above-mentioned effect of the characteristics of agreements, the bargaining level has a 
                                                                
10 These yearly fictitious variables include the effect of all macroeconomic conditionss, growth, inflation trend, etc. 
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considerable effect on the final outcome as measured in terms of the negotiated wage 
increase. Specifically, provincial industry agreements (those reflected by the constant 
term in the regression) give rise to significantly larger wage increases than national 
industry agreements (negotiated at a more centralised level) and than company-level 
agreements (the most decentralised). In the latter case, however, the result for 
private-sector firms with fewer than 30 workers is interesting: the negotiated wage 
increases are larger than those in the corresponding agreements at provincial industry 
level. In the other cases, the company-level agreements contain wage increases 
significantly smaller than those of provincial industry agreements. Also, as expected, 
wage increases were clearly more moderate in public-sector firms. 
In interpreting the effect of firm size on wage increases, the larger increases in 
small firms may be explained as follows. If these firms, which normally have industry 
agreements11, wish to secure a company-level agreement better suited to their needs, 
they have to offer larger wage increases to their workers12. Meanwhile, company-level 
agreements in firms with more than 30 workers contain wage increases significantly 
smaller than those in industry agreements and, moreover, a growing negative effect is 
seen with increasing firm size. Thus large firms, which traditionally have had company-
level agreements and have not been affected by industry agreements, usually negotiate 
wage increases that are even smaller than those prevailing at these higher bargaining 
levels. This indicates a greater internalisation by negotiating agents in these agreements 
of the negative impact that large wage increases could have on firms’ results13. Also, 
contrary to what is sometimes argued, this indicates that, in the results of company-level 
bargaining, there are no discernible cascade effects in negotiation. That is to say, the 
agreements reached at higher than company level do not serve as a reference for 
bargaining at this level14. 
The database has information on other collective agreement characteristics that 
may affect wage increases and bear on the outcome. However, the values of these 
variables are missing in many cases, so their use would entail a significant reduction in 
                                                                
11 It should be noted that the percentage of small firms with company-level agreements is very low. 
12 It will be seen below that this phenomenon seems to have been limited to certain years, while in the rest of the period 
company-level agreements in firms of fewer than 30 workers also resulted in wage increases smaller than those in 
provincial industry agreements. 
13 It will subsequently be seen, however, that wage levels are higher in company-level agreements. Fina et al  (2001) 
also points out that there are other welfare benefits included in company-level agreements that are not found in industry 
agreements. 
14 An additional check was made that there is no cascade effect on the wage increases included in company-level 
agreements. It was done by comparing the wage increase in these agreements with the wage increase in the provincial 
industry agreement of the industry (at the two-digit disaggregation level of the CNAE-93 classification) and the province to 
which the firm belongs. Again, as can be deduced from the regression, the results indicate that there is no bargaining 
cascade effect, i.e. in company-level bargaining the wage increases are, on average, smaller than in the corresponding 
provincial industry agreement. 
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the number of observations. Nevertheless, to check the robustness of the results on how 
bargaining level affects wage increases, Table 17 presents an additional regression in 
which the regressors included are, first, the existence of stoppages or demonstrations 
during collective bargaining and, second, the inclusion of matters other than wage 
increases in collective bargaining. Thus variables have been included to cater for an 
agreement with a reduction of working hours, clauses on employment or on the use of 
overtime, productivity incentives and attendance incentives. 
As can be seen in this table, the use of these variables considerably reduces the 
number of observations (to around 20,000) and the estimate period is restricted to 
1992-2000, but the main findings discussed above are substantially unchanged. Thus 
the effects of bargaining level remain significant and have the same sign.  
Before analysing the yearly bargaining results, a brief mention should be made of 
the estimated effects of the other collective agreement characteristics included in the 
regression. Table 17 shows smaller wage increases in the industrial sector and in 
certain services such as trade and financial services. The results on the effect of the 
time when negotiation took place indicate that, although the differences are small, larger 
wage increases are achieved in the early months of the year. Regarding the effect of 
clauses on other matters included in collective agreements, most noteworthy is the 
positive effect that the inclusion of clauses on the reduction of working hours has on 
wage increases, although this result is tinged by the negative effect of bargaining on 
overtime. As expected, bargaining on productivity incentives reduces wage increases, 
although attendance incentives seem to make them larger. Finally, the effects of 
inflation-adjustment clauses and of multi-year agreements will be analysed later with the 
aid of the yearly regressions performed, since the effect of these variables depends 
crucially on the yearly change in inflation and, in general, on macroeconomic conditions. 
We now return to the complete sample to analyse how collective bargaining has 
varied over time, i.e. to try to identify significant changes in the workings of the collective 
bargaining system during the 1990s. As briefly described in Section 2, legal reforms 
were made to the system in 1994 and 1997, so one of our aims is to detect whether they 
have changed the outcome of collective bargaining in any way. To this end, regressions 
such as that shown in Table 16 were performed for each year of the sample. The results 
indicate that the basic conclusions do not change. Collective bargaining at provincial 
industry level gives rise to larger wage increases than bargaining at higher and at lower 
levels, although a certain variability was observed over the eleven years analysed. 
Analysing first the effect of company-level bargaining, Chart 2 indicates that the 
above-mentioned finding that small private-sector firms paid larger wage increases than 
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at provincial industry level is substantially restricted to the mid-1990s (1994 to 1998)15. 
This could be related to the 1994 reform which was intended, among other things, to 
strengthen company-level bargaining, and which made get-out clauses compulsory in 
collective agreements with a view to defining the conditions under which a firm could be 
released from the industry agreement. These clauses were not particularly important 
because they generally imposed conditions that were too strict, and apparently the firms 
that sought to avail themselves of the possibility of negotiating their own agreement had 
to accept larger wage increases as the price paid in exchange. In the case of large 
firms, Chart 3 shows how company-level agreements generally offer significantly smaller 
wage increases. In medium-sized firms (not shown for brevity), the result is similar and, 
although at a lower level of significance, the smaller wage increases were maintained 
throughout the whole decade analysed. 
Turning to wage increases in public-sector firms in the sample period, Chart 4 
shows that, although for all years the increase negotiated in these firms is smaller than 
that at the reference bargaining level (provincial industry agreement), the effect of the 
sharp budget restrictions in 1993, 1994 and 1997 can be clearly seen. Also calling for 
comment is the growing wage moderation from 1999 onwards. Finally, Chart 5 shows 
how the finding that industry agreements at national level lead to smaller wage 
increases than at provincial level is repeated in most of the years analysed. 
It should be mentioned briefly that the agreed wage increases are affected by the 
time when negotiation takes place. Although the estimated impact is small, there is a 
positive effect on the agreements signed in the first half of the year which tapers off, 
although remaining positive, in the second half. There is therefore no evidence of a 
cascade effect in bargaining whereby the initial agreements serve as a reference for the 
others. Also, several tests were made to detect any effect of “ultra-activity” of 
agreements. Using a regression like that in Table 16, variables were included to capture 
this effect by calculating the difference between the time when the new agreement was 
signed and the expiry date of the previous agreement. In none of the various equations 
estimated were significant results obtained. The “ultra-activity” of agreements probably 
has more effect on the non-monetary conditions established in agreements, whereas a 
significant effect on wage increases is not detectable. 
 
                                                                
15 In Charts 2 to 7 below, the bars represent the coefficients estimated in each of the yearly regressions performed, 
while the lines running down the middle of the bars represent the 90% confidence intervals for these coefficients. 
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4.2. Inflation-adjustment clauses and multi-year agreements 
The yearly regressions described above include a variable to reflect whether or 
not the agreement contains an indexation clause to protect against 
higher-than-expected inflation. This variable should be analysed in yearly regression 
calculations, since its interpretation in the regression for the complete decade is more 
complicated.  
In Chart 6 the first bar for each year represents the effect of inflation-adjustment 
clauses in collective agreements. It can be seen that, for various years of the decade 
analysed, these clauses have enabled the signature of agreements with smaller wage 
increases than those in agreements without clauses. Thus these clauses act as a 
safeguard for workers against unexpectedly high inflation, allowing more moderate wage 
increases. As can be seen in the chart, this effect is significant early and late in the 
decade, when inflation exceeded the initially negotiated reference values, whereas in 
the mid-1990s the sharp fall in inflation meant that these clauses did not significantly 
affect wage increases. 
The second bar for each year represents the effect of the clauses on the revised 
wage increase, i.e. once the effect of the clause has been added to the initially 
negotiated increase. Generally, once the effect of application of the clause has been 
included, the agreements with a clause give rise to larger wage increases than those 
with no clause. That is to say, the safeguard effect of the clauses for workers gives rise 
to a larger wage increase if inflation finally exceeds the forecasts. Only at the beginning 
of the decade did the clauses have a negative effect on revised wage increases. 
Chart 7 depicts the effect of multi-year bargaining on negotiated wage increases. 
Multi-year agreements adjust more slowly to changes in macroeconomic conditions, as 
would be expected. Specifically, it seems that the fall in inflation since the early 1990s 
was reflected in these agreements later than in annual agreements, while the growing 
inflation in the late 1990s had the opposite effect, there being larger wage increases in 
annual agreements. 
In short, the analysis performed, both for the overall period and yearly, has given 
rise to a number of basic findings. The first is that the bargaining level has a major effect 
on the negotiated wage increases. Specifically, wage negotiation at an intermediate 
level -such as the majority provincial industry level in Spain- produces wage increases 
larger than those at company level and at the more centralised national level. This 
finding is in line with the predictions of theoretical models, which forecast higher wage 
pressure at an intermediate bargaining level because the benefit derived from the 
co-ordination at more centralised levels is not achieved and, moreover, the 
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consequences of larger wage increases are not internalised as at more decentralised 
levels. In this context, the fact that at least for some years in small firms, company-level 
bargaining produces larger wage increases seems to be more related to the difficulty 
that these firms have in gaining access to a company-level collective agreement. 
Additionally, the analysis turned up other findings of interest relating to the 
effects of other major characteristics of collective agreements. The existence of 
inflation-adjustment clauses to safeguard against inflation produces, at least ex-ante, 
smaller wage increases. That is to say, these clauses act as a safeguard for workers 
against uncertainty over the course of inflation. However, once the behaviour of inflation 
is known, if inflation exceeds the forecast, then the presence of indexation clauses 
usually produces larger wage increases. Finally, multi-year agreements seem to cause 
wage increases to adjust more slowly to changes in the macroeconomic environment. 
5. Collective bargaining and wage differentiation 
Collective agreements, apart from setting wage increases and other matters 
relating to working conditions, determine minimum guaranteed wage levels that must be 
observed by the firm in question. The workers’ final compensation will differ from that 
minimum due to various wage supplements, but unquestionably these agreed minimum 
levels determine a good part of the wage structure. Therefore it is useful to analyse how 
the characteristics of the collective bargaining system affect wage differentials in Spain, 
the latter being defined in terms of those minimum wage levels. 
The database has information on the wage compensation guaranteed by each 
collective agreement, with a breakdown into eleven job categories16, although this 
information is only available since 1994. The foregoing sections have shown how 
bargaining levels are a basic characteristic of the Spanish collective bargaining system, 
in which a majority of workers are covered by industry agreements at provincial level, 
and this has consequences for the final outcome of bargaining, as measured in terms of 
the wage increases negotiated. We now analyse whether the division into bargaining 
levels affects the distribution of wage levels set in collective agreements, in two 
respects: as regards the differences between job categories at different bargaining 
levels, and as regards the wage differentials caused by bargaining level within each job 
category. 
In an initial analysis of how bargaining level affects wage differentials between 
job categories resulting from collective bargaining, use can be made of the income ratios 
between professional categories at each bargaining level. Specifically, we calculated the 
                                                                
16 They are the same as the social security registration groups. 
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ratio of the income established for the top category (university graduates) to that of the 
bottom category (manual labourers), the ratio of the income of university graduates to 
that of an intermediate skill level (administrative officers), and the ratio of the income of 
administrative officers to that of manual workers. Chart 8 sets forth the yearly changes in 
the first of these ratios in company-level agreements and in industry agreements, the 
latter grouping together both provincial and national agreements. It can be seen that 
industry-level bargaining strongly compresses the wage distribution and significantly 
reduces wage differentials between skill levels. The chart shows that this phenomenon 
has been highly stable since 1994. It therefore seems that the bargaining agents have 
an interest in agreeing on smaller wage differentials between job categories at 
bargaining levels higher than that of the company. Various studies have associated this 
wage compression with the objectives of the social partners, particularly trade unions, 
and with average-voter theories [see, for example, Abellán et al (1997) or Dolado et al 
(1997)]. 
This result is unchanged for the other two income ratios discussed, shown in 
Charts 9 and 10, namely the ratio of university graduate income to administrative officer 
income and the ratio of administrative officer income to manual worker income, 
respectively. In both cases the differences between bargaining levels are minor, 
particularly in the university graduate to administrative officer ratio, and it is apparent 
that industry-level bargaining has a clear compressor effect on the wage distribution. In 
a disaggregated analysis at the level of the eleven broad industries considered in 
preceding sections, this compression of the wage distribution is observed for all 
industries. Chart 11, which plots the ratio of university graduate income to manual 
worker income for 2000, shows that company-level agreements generate a wider wage 
dispersion in all industries except agriculture. Noteworthy here is the scant wage 
dispersion in the extractive, hotel&restaurant and transport industries when bargaining is 
at industry level and the large differences between bargaining levels in the construction, 
transport and financial and business services industries. 
It thus seems clear that company-level bargaining generates wider wage 
dispersion between job categories than bargaining at higher levels does. That said, the 
industry level is relatively broad in Spanish collective bargaining and it should be 
ascertained whether major differences exist at industry level depending on whether 
bargaining is at provincial level (50% of workers) or at national level (25% of workers). 
Chart 12 shows (only for 2000 given the above-mentioned stability) the income ratios 
between job categories at each bargaining level, distinguishing provincial industry and 
national industry agreements. Although both these higher-level agreements give rise to 
greater wage compression than company-level agreements, national agreements 
involve more wage dispersion than provincial agreements, particularly in the upper part 
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of the job category distribution. Hence provincial industry agreements are characterised 
by a lower wage dispersion between job categories, not only compared with 
company-level agreements, but also compared with national industry agreements. 
As noted, this is particularly true for the upper part of the job category 
distribution, whereas the wage differentials in the lower part of this distribution seem 
similar in both types of industry agreement. Abellán et al (1997), for example, describe 
an upward effect on the wages of lower job categories in provincial agreements with 
respect to national agreements17. To analyse this effect, Chart 13 plots the ratio of 
guaranteed income in national agreements to guaranteed income in provincial 
agreements for the disaggregation of the ten job categories available. In effect, it can be 
seen that, although the national agreements guarantee a higher wage level for more 
highly skilled workers (long-cycle graduates, short-cycle graduates, chief administrative 
officers and workshop chiefs), this is not so for intermediate skill levels, where the 
guaranteed wage levels are higher in provincial industry agreements than in national 
industry agreements (the income ratio is less than 1). It thus seems that at provincial 
level (the majority Spanish collective bargaining level), the bargaining agents prefer to 
raise the income of the intermediate skill levels18. 
Finally, to complete the analysis of intra-category differences and check the 
effect of bargaining level on them, Chart 14 shows the ratio, for 1994 and 2000 and the 
ten job categories, of total guaranteed compensation in company-level agreements to 
that in industry agreements, again grouping together provincial and national 
agreements. For all job categories, the wage levels set in company-level agreements 
are higher than in industry agreements. These differences are considerably larger for 
high worker skill levels, and are smallest for intermediate skill levels. In all cases, the 
stability throughout the period analysed is notable. 
By way of a summary of the information presented so far on how the bargaining 
level affects the degree of wage differentiation deriving from collective bargaining, 
Chart 15 sets forth histograms of the wage income established in the 2000 agreements 
for the ten job categories and of the average wage settlements19, distinguishing industry 
and company-level agreements. The wage distributions are notably more compressed in 
industry agreements than in company-level agreements for all job categories and the 
wage compression increases with decreasing skill level. In aggregated terms, the 
average wage settlement therefore exhibits a notably wider dispersion in company-level 
                                                                
17 Their database only includes the construction and the manufacturing agreements for 1990. 
18 Analysis of the distribution of workers by job category also shows that in provincial agreements the proportion of 
workers with intermediate skill levels is higher. 
19 Calculated as the weighted average income of job categories, using the number of workers in each category as the 
weight. 
25 
agreements. This can also be seen from the fact that the Gini coefficient has a value 
of 0.29 in company-level agreements, whereas it is 0.11 in industry agreements. 
To sum up, this section has presented abundant empirical evidence of the effect 
that collective bargaining has on wage differentiation in Spain. Specifically, it has shown 
how the majority bargaining level (the provincial industry level) exerts a very strong 
compressor effect on wage distribution. The wage levels negotiated at this level are 
notably more homogeneous across job categories than at company level, and also more 
uniform than at national industry level. Moreover, the wage dispersion within each 
category is lower in industry agreements than in the case of company-level agreements. 
Also detected were notable wage differentials in favour of company-level agreements 
which become more pronounced with increasing worker skill level. A comparison of 
provincial industry and national industry agreements shows that these differences are in 
favour of the latter at high worker skill levels, whereas at intermediate skill levels there 
are positive differences for provincial agreements that seem to be related to the workers 
represented by the bargaining agents. 
6. Summary and conclusions 
This paper has used individual information on all collective agreements in force 
in Spain between 1990 and 2001, drawn from the official statistics on collective 
agreements compiled by the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social Security, to conduct 
an analysis of the main collective bargaining characteristics and identify their effects on 
bargaining outcomes. 
The empirical evidence suggests that the bargaining level has a major effect on 
both the wage increases and the distribution of wage levels by job category established 
in collective agreements. In the first case, the intermediate bargaining level (provincial 
industry level) sees wage increases that are generally larger than those agreed at a 
more centralised (national industry) level and at a more decentralised (company) level. 
This is in line with various theoretical studies that report that intermediate bargaining 
levels achieve less efficient outcomes in terms of adjusting wage behaviour to labour 
market conditions. On the one hand, a more centralised bargaining level would facilitate 
the incorporation of constraints derived from the macroeconomic environment; on the 
other, at a more decentralised level the bargaining outcome would be better tailored to 
the firm’s specific conditions and the bargaining agents would perceive more directly the 
costs of the higher wage pressure. All this is particularly relevant in the case of Spain, 
given that more than half of the workers subject to collective agreements negotiate at 
this intermediate (provincial industry) level. 
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Our analysis of the characteristics of collective agreements and of their effect on 
agreed wage increases yielded notable conclusions on the effect of inflation-adjustment 
clauses when inflation deviates from forecasts. These clauses act as a safeguard 
against uncertainty over future inflation, whereby they initially lead to smaller wage 
increases than those set in agreements without clauses. However, the indexation 
induced by the clauses means that subsequently, when there is an upward inflation 
deviation, the revised wage increases are higher than those established in agreements 
without clauses. 
Regarding the effect of bargaining level on wage structure, bargaining at higher 
than company level produces a notable compression of the wage structure established 
in collective agreements. Bargaining at these levels very clearly reduces the dispersion 
of the wage levels guaranteed in collective agreements, both between different worker 
skill levels (job categories) and between workers of the same skill level. Also, bargaining 
has a positive effect at the (majority) provincial industry level on the guaranteed income 
of intermediate category workers. 
Finally, it should be noted that the approach adopted is basically descriptive and 
that appropriately defined wage equations will be estimated in a second phase in which 
the information on collective agreement characteristics will be combined with that on 
firms from the Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office. This will provide 
the information required to estimate these equations and, it is hoped, will enable us to 
corroborate the findings presented here on the effect of collective bargaining level and to 
analyse in more detail the influence of collective bargaining on the workings of firms. 
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Local Provincial Intra-regional Inter-regional National Company
1990 0.15 54.74 2.81 1.17 26.10 15.02
1991 0.13 56.01 2.67 1.21 25.04 14.94
1992 0.13 54.78 3.69 1.06 25.13 15.22
1993 0.16 55.06 6.13 3.19 21.57 13.89
1994 0.19 54.73 4.09 2.59 24.37 14.03
1995 0.15 55.25 3.12 0.24 27.14 14.09
1996 1.68 51.91 5.27 0.23 27.42 13.49
1997 0.16 51.37 5.76 0.06 30.30 12.35
1998 0.13 51.84 6.01 0.10 29.71 12.21
1999 0.17 52.07 5.51 0.07 29.74 12.43
2000 0.13 52.89 8.07 0.02 26.83 12.07
2001 0.12 55.30 9.44 0.00 24.39 10.74
Average 1990-2001 0.28 53.75 5.29 0.79 26.59 13.32
Industry
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Security and Banco de España.
   Distribution of workers covered by collective agreements according to bargaining 
level (%)
Table 1
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Company
Provincial
industry
National
industry
1990 346.16 14.33 124.55
1991 329.37 15.83 131.77
1992 324.95 14.24 143.97
1993 307.66 13.99 47.07
1994 313.88 16.00 63.90
1995 298.45 14.51 202.00
1996 287.40 15.22 213.74
1997 269.89 14.68 238.44
1998 276.17 15.11 232.47
1999 286.62 16.02 234.47
2000 279.32 16.37 246.81
2001 261.80 16.68 279.39
Average 1990-2001 298.00 15.22 185.50
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
Average firm size by bargaining level
Table 2
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Local Provincial Intra-regional Inter-regional National Company
Agriculture 0.24 88.58 7.82 0.07 2.85 0.45
Extractive industries 0.08 27.35 4.42 0.00 0.56 67.59
Manufacturing 0.06 44.44 0.31 0.30 39.55 15.34
Energy 0.03 5.05 0.41 0.00 0.00 94.52
Construction 1.24 97.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.94
Wholesale & retail trade 0.41 67.00 4.77 1.63 19.99 6.20
Restaurants & hotels 0.00 78.60 18.42 0.00 0.00 2.98
Transport 0.25 43.08 0.21 0.37 8.32 47.77
Financial services 0.03 0.46 0.00 8.62 81.85 9.04
Business services 0.05 29.77 24.29 0.34 40.78 4.75
Other services 0.25 21.40 8.76 0.61 40.01 28.98
Total 0.28 53.75 5.29 0.79 26.59 13.32
Industry
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
Distribution of workers by bargaining level and industry (CNAE-93 sections) (%). 1990-2001
Table 3
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1994 2000
Average
1994-2000 1994 2000
Average
1994-2000
Reduction of working hours 13.1 33.8 18.5 7.9 27.9 13.3
Hiring (a) 60.0 80.2 74.5 21.1 65.3 60.6
Employment 42.8 55.9 54.9 62.3 68.7 68.8
Overtime 43.7 43.5 41.9 46.2 45.4 47.2
Retirement 36.0 52.4 46.6 46.6 54.7 54.7
Other benefits 52.5 68.2 61.1 73.9 75.6 78.4
Pensions 1.9 2.1 2.6 16.5 34.8 29.1
Vocational training 45.2 51.7 53.5 57.0 68.8 65.5
Minimum wage 28.7 30.0 30.5 18.8 20.0 21.9
Restaurant 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.1 21.3 23.0
Transport 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.5 22.6 22.0
Productivity incentives 23.8 20.4 23.3 54.3 53.0 53.5
Attendance incentives 21.6 17.6 19.1 33.7 29.8 31.8
Industry Company
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
   (a)   The first data item relates to 1996 and the average to the period 1996-2000.
Workers covered by collective agreements with clauses on other matters, by bargaining level (%)
Table 4
 
31 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec May-Jul
1990 4.4   6.9   13.6   15.1   18.5   14.7   11.3   2.3   2.8   4.0   3.6   2.9   44.5   
1991 3.0   5.8   7.2   13.6   19.4   18.0   14.0   2.6   4.2   4.9   3.4   4.1   51.3   
1992 5.1   6.2   9.4   13.8   14.3   16.4   13.9   2.7   5.1   5.1   3.8   4.2   44.6   
1993 3.3   6.1   8.4   9.4   13.2   17.8   13.9   2.6   4.6   8.0   6.8   6.0   44.9   
1994 3.7   3.9   5.6   5.1   10.0   14.9   15.8   4.4   7.6   9.8   9.7   9.4   40.7   
1995 4.6   6.6   8.1   8.3   14.3   15.5   12.6   3.3   4.8   7.7   7.6   6.7   42.4   
1996 5.5   6.0   7.7   7.4   12.5   14.1   14.4   2.9   6.1   7.8   6.4   9.2   41.0   
1997 5.2   6.4   8.3   10.6   11.7   12.8   14.3   2.6   5.0   6.8   7.2   9.1   38.8   
1998 6.1   6.1   8.6   9.9   13.1   15.3   13.2   2.2   4.6   6.7   7.0   7.3   41.6   
1999 5.1   5.1   8.1   8.5   15.1   15.7   13.1   2.0   4.7   6.4   7.3   8.8   43.9   
2000 5.0   7.5   10.0   9.5   12.4   14.1   12.7   2.7   5.5   6.4   6.6   7.5   39.3   
2001 7.2   9.4   11.8   10.9   15.7   15.0   16.0   4.1   3.4   4.4   1.7   0.4   46.7   
Average 90-01 4.8   6.2   8.8   10.2   14.1   15.3   13.7   2.8   4.9   6.5   6.0   6.5   43.2   
Month of signature
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
Distribution of agreements by month of signature (%)
Table 5
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Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec May-Jul
Company 5.2   6.8   9.4   10.4   14.1   14.4   12.3   2.9   5.1   6.7   5.9   6.8   40.7   
Provincial industry 3.7   4.5   7.1   9.5   14.4   18.2   17.7   2.6   4.5   6.1   6.3   5.5   50.3   
National industry 2.4   5.0   7.4   9.1   15.4   19.0   17.0   0.5   4.4   6.9   5.6   7.2   51.4   
Month of signature
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
Distribution of agreements by month of signature and bargaining level (%)
Table 6
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Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec May-Jul
Agriculture 5.0   6.2   9.3   8.7   15.3   11.7   12.7   5.0   4.4   7.2   7.2   7.2   39.7   
Extractive industries 4.6   3.7   6.3   8.9   15.4   17.4   17.5   2.9   4.8   7.9   6.4   4.2   50.3   
Manufacturing 3.4   5.2   9.0   11.7   16.0   16.3   14.7   2.1   5.2   6.2   5.2   4.9   47.0   
Energy 4.6   6.2   7.5   9.2   12.1   16.1   14.2   3.4   4.4   7.4   7.2   7.6   42.5   
Construction 2.9   3.9   8.1   9.6   18.6   27.5   18.6   1.4   2.6   2.7   2.0   2.3   64.6   
Wholesale & retail trade 4.5   6.9   8.9   10.3   13.7   14.5   14.3   2.5   5.0   7.4   6.0   6.0   42.5   
Restaurants & hotels 5.8   6.2   9.4   9.5   15.5   15.6   14.4   4.4   5.2   4.9   3.6   5.5   45.4   
Transport 5.6   6.7   8.0   9.5   12.6   15.4   13.6   4.3   4.6   6.7   6.9   6.1   41.6   
Financial services 7.4   6.8   8.7   10.0   8.5   11.1   10.5   1.1   4.3   8.2   9.3   14.1   30.1   
Business services 6.9   7.2   9.5   9.5   11.4   14.5   11.2   2.6   5.3   6.4   6.5   8.9   37.1   
Other services 6.2   7.2   8.8   8.8   12.8   14.1   12.0   3.1   4.9   6.6   6.9   8.6   38.9   
Month of signature
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
Distribution of agreements by month of signature and industry (%). 1990-2001
Table 7
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Annual 1-2 2-3 >3 Total
1990 0.0   0.0   0.0   100.0   100.0   
1991 0.0   12.6   70.3   17.1   100.0   
1992 4.1   61.5   10.0   24.4   95.9   
1993 62.6   25.8   7.6   4.0   37.4   
1994 53.7   35.7   9.1   1.5   46.3   
1995 53.6   36.6   8.8   1.0   46.4   
1996 37.7   30.0   17.1   15.2   62.3   
1997 35.7   28.0   24.8   11.5   64.3   
1998 38.5   24.8   30.1   6.6   61.5   
1999 26.5   34.0   33.6   5.9   73.5   
2000 18.0   24.2   40.4   17.3   82.0   
2001 21.6   24.9   35.5   18.0   78.4   
Average 90-01 39.4   30.3   21.5   8.8   60.6   
Multi-year (years)
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de 
España.
Distribution of workers by agreement term and year of 
commencement of term  (%)
Table 8
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Annual 1-2 2-3 >3 Total
Company 31.2   35.5   22.5   10.8   68.8   
Provincial industry 48.4   28.2   18.1   5.2   51.6   
National industry 26.5   32.2   27.7   13.6   73.5   
Multi-year (years)
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
Distribution of workers by agreement term and bargaining 
level (%).
1990-2001
Table 9
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Annual 1-2 2-3 >3 Total
Agriculture 41.5   35.1   22.7   0.7   58.5   
Extractive industries 35.5   33.5   17.7   13.3   64.5   
Manufacturing 37.5   35.7   19.5   7.4   62.5   
Energy 23.5   32.6   32.3   11.5   76.5   
Construction 80.7   6.2   10.3   2.8   19.3   
Wholesale & retail trade 34.1   38.6   14.4   12.9   65.9   
Restaurants & hotels 22.1   31.9   41.7   4.3   77.9   
Transport 34.0   35.1   24.8   6.1   66.0   
Financial services 11.8   13.9   41.9   32.4   88.2   
Business services 23.9   22.3   30.4   23.5   76.1   
Other services 26.2   35.4   27.9   10.4   73.8   
Multi-year (years)
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
Distribution of workers by agreement term and industry (%).
1990-2001
Table 10
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Local Provincial Intra-regional Inter-regional National Company Total
1990 0.01 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.25 0.54 0.22
1991 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.17 0.05
1992 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.28 0.10 0.16 0.08
1993 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.23 0.08 0.14 0.09
1994 0.21 0.24 0.05 0.53 0.16 0.30 0.23
1995 0.14 0.22 0.11 0.47 0.35 0.33 0.27
1996 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
1997 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00
1998 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1999 0.22 0.18 0.48 0.00 0.38 0.38 0.28
2000 0.79 0.45 0.42 0.00 0.96 0.81 0.63
2001 0.31 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.23 0.23 0.14
Industry
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
Effect of inflation-adjustment clauses by bargaining level (%)
Table 11
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Company
Provincial
industry
National
industry
Total
0 13.76 56.75 22.12 43.63
0-0,5 1.53 2.52 10.98 4.72
0,5-1 7.60 6.77 1.34 4.63
1-1,5 12.71 11.26 5.41 9.01
1,5-2 4.36 2.94 12.27 5.68
2 51.29 18.26 43.98 29.54
>2 8.74 1.49 3.89 2.78
Effect of 
clause (a)
Bargaining level
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
   (a)   The official inflation forecast in 2000 was 2%, whereas the year-
on-year CPI growth rate 4%.
Percentage of workers subject to inflation-adjustment 
clauses by effect of clause and bargaining level.
2000
Table 12
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Local Provincial Intra-regional Inter-regional National Company Total
1990 15.93 58.69 5.25 97.32 69.99 68.02 61.92
1991 10.48 62.19 5.11 95.15 68.11 63.51 62.67
1992 32.03 59.57 41.89 97.49 76.73 61.19 63.84
1993 31.72 62.24 50.40 98.95 50.63 47.74 58.12
1994 35.32 58.97 37.94 98.18 32.48 47.94 51.08
1995 27.39 63.15 62.00 48.92 61.12 60.19 62.06
1996 95.78 64.29 28.55 45.18 52.14 54.35 58.22
1997 41.51 56.75 49.06 0.00 51.62 38.93 52.49
1998 42.50 50.11 39.87 60.18 50.03 38.30 48.03
1999 28.25 58.66 67.51 77.03 64.03 43.68 58.84
2000 63.28 64.97 75.12 0.00 73.94 52.06 66.62
2001 53.82 72.99 78.14 0.00 75.02 60.71 72.63
Industry
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
Percentage of workers with inflation-adjustment clauses by bargaining level (%)
Table 13
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Annual Multi-year
1990 58.67 63.75
1991 64.85 61.77
1992 51.43 66.52
1993 62.14 55.98
1994 67.78 40.17
1995 72.80 57.00
1996 66.57 55.40
1997 65.17 49.37
1998 71.82 42.74
1999 74.73 56.30
2000 69.17 66.41
2001 75.44 72.39
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs 
and Banco de España.
Percentage of workers with inflation-
adjustment clause by agreement term (%)
Table 14
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Local Provincial Intra-regional Inter-regional National Company
1990 11.6 19.3 63.6 6.5 32.8 68.2
1991 10.8 7.7 0.0 12.8 0.0 46.1
1992 20.3 24.9 3.8 88.1 35.4 66.8
1993 99.0 9.9 1.6 40.1 64.0 35.1
1994 79.4 75.7 13.6 100.0 77.7 93.9
1995 100.0 77.7 23.6 100.0 90.9 79.4
1996 2.7 62.5 97.6 100.0 80.6 80.4
1997 100.0 51.2 43.4 0.0 80.4 89.5
1998 100.0 59.1 13.1 0.0 77.5 91.0
1999 100.0 42.2 65.3 0.0 71.1 90.6
2000 100.0 48.3 30.1 0.0 80.0 90.5
2001 100.0 57.4 29.6 0.0 87.5 91.4
Industry
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
Percentage of retroactive inflation-adjustment clauses by bargaining level (%)
Table 15
 
Co-efficient
Standard
deviation
t
Constant 8.6878 0.0697 124.65
Public-sector firm -0.7923 0.0438 -18.08
Private-sector firm. <30 workers 0.0829 0.0380 2.18
Private-sector firm. 30-100 workers -0.0729 0.0352 -2.07
Private-sector firm. 100-500 workers -0.2306 0.0366 -6.30
Private-sector firm. >500 workers -0.4840 0.0577 -8.40
Sectoral / Local 0.0928 0.1520 0.61
Sectoral / Intra-regional -0.2124 0.1429 -1.49
Sectoral / Inter-regional -0.2081 0.3017 -0.69
Sectoral / National -0.3487 0.0968 -3.60
Agriculture -0.0673 0.0872 -0.77
Extractive industries -0.5924 0.0929 -6.37
Manufacturing -0.2085 0.0334 -6.24
Energy -0.0811 0.0718 -1.13
Construction -0.2337 0.0978 -2.39
Wholesale & retail trade -0.3342 0.0421 -7.93
Restaurants & hotels -0.0574 0.0712 -0.81
Transport -0.1142 0.0447 -2.56
Financial services -0.3294 0.1119 -2.94
Business services -0.1841 0.0573 -3.21
January 0.0763 0.0681 1.12
February 0.2464 0.0636 3.87
March 0.1459 0.0586 2.49
April 0.1266 0.0569 2.23
May 0.1662 0.0538 3.09
June 0.1710 0.0531 3.22
July 0.1375 0.0541 2.54
August 0.1603 0.0818 1.96
September 0.0626 0.0676 0.93
October 0.0011 0.0626 0.02
November 0.1005 0.0635 1.58
Inflation-ajdustment clause -0.2357 0.0237 -9.94
Multi-year agreement 0.0203 0.0253 0.80
Adjusted R2:                              0.42 Number of observations:              
Number of observations:        52,629
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Security and Banco de España.
   (a)   The regression includes dummy time variables. The constant term defines a provincial-industry level 
agreement signed in the "other services" industry in December for 1990, with a 1-year term and without an 
inflation-adjustment clause.
Salary increases versus various agreement characteristics (a)
1990-2000.
Table 16
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Co-efficient
Standard
deviation t
Constant 6.7487 0.2332 28.93
Public-sector firm -0.9191 0.0481 -19.10
Private-sector firm. <30 workers 0.2206 0.0424 5.21
Private-sector firm. 30-100 workers -0.0247 0.0399 -0.62
Private-sector firm. 100-500 workers -0.1400 0.0422 -3.32
Private-sector firm. >500 workers -0.3280 0.0682 -4.81
Sectoral / Local -0.0819 0.1626 -0.50
Sectoral / Intra-regional -0.1559 0.1656 -0.94
Sectoral / Inter-regional -0.1090 0.2937 -0.37
Sectoral / National -0.3682 0.1033 -3.57
Agriculture 0.0379 0.0999 0.38
Extractive industries -0.2286 0.1107 -2.07
Manufacturing -0.1426 0.0376 -3.80
Energy 0.1681 0.0815 2.06
Construction -0.4264 0.1130 -3.77
Wholesale & retail trade -0.2550 0.0464 -5.49
Restaurants & hotels 0.0200 0.0759 0.26
Transport -0.1555 0.0492 -3.16
Financial services -0.2641 0.1197 -2.21
Business services -0.0736 0.0637 -1.16
January 0.2149 0.0742 2.90
February 0.3534 0.0699 5.06
March 0.4118 0.0649 6.35
April 0.4419 0.0644 6.86
May 0.4238 0.0590 7.18
June 0.2880 0.0572 5.03
July 0.2482 0.0578 4.29
August 0.2242 0.0850 2.64
September 0.1301 0.0710 1.83
October 0.1664 0.0648 2.57
November 0.1128 0.0667 1.69
Inflation-ajdustment clause 0.0253 0.0261 0.97
Multi-year agreement 0.0935 0.0286 3.27
Strikes during agreement -0.0283 0.0634 -0.45
Demonstrations during agreement 0.0193 0.0652 0.30
Reduction of working hours 0.2947 0.0402 7.34
Other clauses on employment 0.0009 0.0312 0.03
Clauses on overtime -0.1123 0.0271 -4.14
Production incentives -0.1285 0.0309 -4.15
Attendance incentives 0.0845 0.0309 2.73
Adjusted R2:                      0.1732 
Number of observations:    20,542
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Security and Banco de España.
   (a)  The regression includes dummy time variables. The constant term defines a provincial-industry level 
agreement signed in the "other services" industry in December for 1992, with a 1-year term and without an 
inflation-adjustment clausel.
Wage increases versus various agreement characteristics (a)
1992-2000.
Table 17
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Wage increases and level of centralisation of bargaining
CHART 1
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
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Effect of company-level bargaining in small firms
CHART 2
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
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Effect of company-level bargaining in large firms
CHART 3
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
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Wage moderation in public-sector firms
CHART 4
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
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Effect of bargaining at national industry level
CHART 5
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
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Effect of inflation adjustment clauses
CHART 6
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   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
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Effect of multi-year agreements
CHART 7
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
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Ratio of total compensation of university graduates to that of manual workers by bargaining level
CHART 8
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
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Ratio of total compensation of university graduates to that of administrative officers by bargaining level
CHART 9
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
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Ratio of total compensation of administrative officers to that of manual workers by bargaining level
CHART 10
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
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Ratio of total compensation of university graduate to that of manual worker by bargaining level 
and industry in 2000
CHART 11
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
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Total compensation ratio by worker category and bargaining level in 2000
CHART 12
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
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Total compensation ratio in national industry agreements to that in provincial industry agreements 
by job category
CHART 13
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
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Ratio of total compensation established at company level to that at industry level by job category
CHART 14
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
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Appendix 1: Description of data 
To analyse the characteristics and results of the collective bargaining system in 
Spain, we use a database taken from the register kept by the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security, which contains detailed information on all collective agreements signed. 
This information is taken from the statistical forms which the agents signing each 
agreement are required to complete and which summarise the agreement’s main 
characteristics. Specifically, the database contains 58,236 observations relating to the 
collective agreements in force between 1990 and 2001, which affect an average 
of 8,135,989 workers per year. It should be noted that the information on 2001 is 
incomplete because there were agreements yet to be registered. 
This database provides information on a wide range of the characteristics of 
agreements, such as the level at which they are negotiated, the date of signature, the 
term (i.e. the period of time that the agreement is in force), the bargaining agents, the 
industry, the geographical scope of application and the number of workers covered. It 
also has information on the outcome of bargaining, including the wage increase agreed, 
whether or not there are inflation-adjustment clauses, the value of the price index used 
as a reference, the working hours and the agreed annual holiday. In addition, the 
database contains the annual wage compensation per worker guaranteed by each 
collective agreement, with a breakdown into eleven job categories, although this 
information is only available since 1994.  
The list of matters negotiated is completed with information on whether the 
agreement includes other clauses on diverse subjects. In particular, there is information 
on the inclusion of clauses on employment (job maintenance, conversion of permanent 
contract into temporary contract, etc.) and on hiring (probationary period, limits on 
temporary hiring, work-experience contracts, training contracts, part-time 
contracts, etc.), clauses on reduction of working hours, overtime, retirement, welfare 
benefit supplements, pension schemes, vocational training, minimum wage, restaurant 
services, worker transport, productivity incentives and attendance incentives. Finally, 
there are variables to indicate whether there were stoppages and/or demonstrations 
during collective bargaining, i.e. to inform of the circumstances in which bargaining took 
place. 
Additionally, an identification variable enables each agreement to be monitored 
over time, i.e. it enables this database to be used as a panel, with all the associated 
analytical advantages that this entails. 
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Appendix 2: Tables 
Local Provincial Intra-regional Inter-regional National Company
Agriculture 0.44 89.50 6.75 0.00 2.72 0.59
Extractive industries 0.00 26.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 73.36
Manufacturing 0.05 45.85 0.16 0.27 36.37 17.28
Energy 0.00 3.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 96.65
Construction 0.00 98.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.34
Wholesale & retail trade 0.33 68.96 3.90 0.26 19.62 6.93
Restaurants & hotels 0.00 79.27 17.55 0.00 0.00 3.19
Transport 0.30 46.75 0.00 1.47 8.69 42.80
Financial services 0.00 0.69 0.00 21.77 68.31 9.23
Business services 0.00 43.84 2.99 1.02 44.62 7.53
Other services 0.16 22.20 5.55 0.42 43.00 28.68
Total 0.14 55.18 3.06 1.15 25.42 15.06
Industry
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
Distribution of workers by bargaining level and industry (CNAE-93 sections) (%). 1990-1992
Table A1
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Local Provincial Intra-regional Inter-regional National Company
Agriculture 0.27 88.37 8.95 0.00 1.86 0.56
Extractive industries 0.13 34.23 3.67 0.00 1.93 60.04
Manufacturing 0.05 45.15 0.43 0.07 40.11 14.19
Energy 0.00 9.05 1.22 0.00 0.00 89.72
Construction 0.00 99.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.77
Wholesale & retail trade 0.37 64.28 8.39 0.00 21.18 5.78
Restaurants & hotels 0.00 78.03 19.40 0.00 0.00 2.57
Transport 0.12 45.29 0.81 0.00 10.40 43.36
Financial services 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.00 92.66 7.07
Business services 0.00 30.36 32.56 0.12 32.64 4.32
Other services 0.38 16.10 9.20 0.00 44.21 30.11
Total 0.14 53.34 7.61 0.03 27.09 11.79
Industry
   Source: Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and Banco de España.
Distribution of workers by bargaining level and industry (CNAE-93 sections) (%). 1999-2001
Table A2
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